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Purpose: This article aims to study trade tensions between advanced economies and to 
express the difference between “currency war” and “trade war” and the respective effects 
on the global economy.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: The analysis of trade relations between countries is always 
one of the main concerns of policymakers and economists. In this paper, interactions Dollar-
Yuan, Yuan-Euro and Dollar-Euro are modeled using game theory, being the effect of 
protectionism and currency devaluation in trade tensions studied by introducing a new game 
defined as threat game. 
Findings: Our findings show that protectionism and negotiation strategy is a credible 
deterrent threat and can be a brake for a total currency war. Also, we use the concept of 
rational choice to demonstrate that, for advanced economies, the cooperation strategy is the 
best way to overcome the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. 
Practical Implications: The subject discussed in the paper refers to issues related to 
protectionism, currency war and negotiation. The holistic perspective that is applied in this 
study includes the expression of a dominant strategy in trade relations between countries 
that helps to prevent the competitive devaluation of money. The consequences of the 
currency war have been catastrophic for the global economy and have ultimately led to a 
global depression. It also outlines ways to converge in overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic.   
Originality/Value: This paper focuses on the prospects for trade relations between advanced 
economies such as the United States, Europe and China. As a result, the perspective 
proposed allows us to make a significant and innovative contribution to the literature 
because it can equip relevant stakeholders in the Global Economic System with the 
necessary strategies to make efficient decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the 20th century, two huge currency wars had very significant impacts on 
economies orldwidew . The term currency war is referred to represent the situation in 
which countries seek to increase their exports, to create employments at the expense 
of their trade partners and to gain market share through the competitive reduction of 
the national currency value (Rickards, 2012). When factors as consumption, 
governmental expenses, or investment are not able to create economic growth in the 
country, it may be necessary to make the currency cheaper as the fastest way to 
achieve the exports increase, leading then to economic growth as the last bargaining 
chip in trade competition (Cohen, 2018). Historically, there are some important 
cases of currency wars. It is the case of the one that started when Germany devalued 
its currency in 1921, or the example of another one when Great Britain devaluated 
its currency in 1967, or yet the one occurred when the USA devalued their currency 
in the 2008’s financial crisis (Guillaumin, 2017; Włodarczyk, 2014). In accordance, 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies adopted by central banks of economies under recession 
work as contributors to the collapse of global trade (Pera, 2018).  
 
In today’s world, currencies are not only used as an economic tool; a currency is 
often converted into a super-strategic weapon that allows the aggressor to take secret 
actions that are significantly destructive. Considering the country’s strategic goals 
and benefits, a financial war may be launched as a weapon to force economic and 
political competitors to move out. By using such threatening strategy, a country 
intends to provoke relevant damages on competitors (Forrest et al., 2017).   
 
The threatening issue concerns to a situation for which the opposite party is 
conducted to use a specified strategy. This situation has been recognized since a long 
time ago in the military literature and in international relations. The selection of such 
specific strategy by the opposite party sometimes is called deterrence issue (Paul et 
al., 2009). Deterrence is generally defined as the unilateral use of a set of threats to 
persuade another party to not perform an undesirable act. Thomas Schelling 
deepened the understanding of this issue by introducing the credible and non-
credible concepts (Schelling, 1966; Schelling, 1980). The credibility of a threat 
exists as a real threat when the opponent party believes that the opposite one 
possesses such ability (Bolt and Houba, 2006; Zegart, 2020). In other words, the 
reasonability of a threat is the requisite for its credibility (Antoniou, 2020; 
Blanchard, 2016). Commitment and threat are important issues in game theory: 
commitment is a useful promise for the opposite party; by its turn the threat is a 
harmful promise for the opposite party (Sun and Sun, 2018). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate trade tensions between advanced 
economies, by raising first some questions and getting then the answers to them, 
involving the field of trade relations between countries. The following questions 
may be posed what is the difference between the trade tension and the currency war? 
which one of them is better, the trade tension or the currency war? For answering 
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these questions, it is necessary to determine, to some extent, the global economic 
path on this. Besides, there is yet another interesting question to be raised, that may 
be posed as: how can a country pull the brake of the currency war to prevent 
economic depression in the global economy? 
 
In this article, we seek to answer these questions. We introduce a new game to 
model the trade tension between the USA and China. This new game is named threat 
game or currency war game. The new game is a type of generation of the chicken 
game. By using the new game, threats are divided into three categories. The first 
category includes non-credible threats. The second includes credible-deterrent 
threats to deter and prevent struggles in which a player threatens the opponents to 
select a strategy to warn the opponent, and the opponent believes that he possesses 
such ability. The third category includes a strictly-credible threat aiming to destroy 
the opponent, being the player highly motivated to put the threat into action even if 
the situation results in a struggle. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present the game theory 
issue in the current situation and the credible threats.  we introduce the threat 
game/currency war game. In the section 3, we model the currency war games, 
specifically the Dollar-Yuan, the Yuan-Euro and the Dollar-Euro games using the 
game theory. In the section 4, we focus on the impact of the coronavirus pandemic 
on the global economy and on the international community, using the tools in this 
area. The last section is left to the discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Game Theory and Credible Threats 
 
Game theory provides suitable models and tools to decision-makers who interact 
with the objective of maximizing their own benefits (Eshaghi Gordji and Askari, 
2018; Mailath, 2019). The chicken game, also called hawk–dove game or snowdrift 
game, is one of the known games highly applied for modeling rational agents and 
irrational agents’ behavior (Eshaghi Gordji and Askari, 2018; Krstić and Krstić, 
2016; Liu et al., 2019). The chicken game   is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Chicken game  
Player 1 Player 2  
C D 
C 0, 0 -2, 2 
D 2, -2 -6, -6 
Note: C= Cooperate; D= Non-cooperate. 
Source: Own study. 
 
The chicken game is a symmetric game, having two equilibriums with pure 
strategies. According to many theorists, it is difficult to reach the chicken game 
equilibriums under real conditions. However, most theorists mention that the final 
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result of many crises is a compromise, in which none of the players withdraw from 
the direct route with the help of the steering wheel; and additionally they are not 
losers, what is similar to pulling the brake. This fact leads us to introduce a new 
game or a sort of generalization of the chicken game, which is highly capable of 
providing the analysis of the events, which flows based on credible and non-credible 
threats, despite its simplicity. 
 
2.1  Threat Game or Currency War Game 
 
Imagine two drivers who drive towards each other. Let’s consider the following 
situations: 1. the driver does not use the brake on the route and uses the only steering 
wheel to swerve ( ); 2. The driver does not use the steering wheel on the route and 
uses the only brake to pull up on the route ( ); 3. The driver does not use the 
steering wheel and brake on the route and only go straight ( ). Each driver has 
three selected options: he/she can continue going straight ( ), pull the brake ( ), 
or swerve ( ).  The player who selects  is named “chicken” and will swerve; what 
is the non-credible strategy. The player who selects  will pull the brake; it is a 
credible-deterrent strategy. The player who selects  will continue going straight; 
as a result, it is a strictly-credible strategy. We show the threat game  in Table 2.  
 
Table 2.  Threat game or Currency war game  
Player 1           Player 2  
S B SB 
S 0, 0 -3, 3 -2, 2 
B 3, -3 1, 1 -3, -5 
SB 2, -2 -5, -3 -6, -6 
Note: S=Steering wheel; B=Brake; SB=Steering Wheel-Brake 
Source: Own study. 
 
The threat game is a symmetric game. In this game, strategy  is the strictly 
dominant strategy over the strategy  for both players. Therefore, the strategy  
is strictly dominated and can be eliminated. By comparing the remaining strategies, 
we notice that strategy  is the strictly dominant strategy over strategy   for both 
players. As a result, strategy  can also be eliminated. Therefore, the game 
equilibrium   will be got, using the consecutive elimination of the strictly 
dominated strategies.  
 
In the chicken game, it is assumed that each player prefers to win and if she/he is not 
able to get it, she/he intends to get a compromise, although there will not be a 
compromising point on the game equilibrium options. In the threat game, while the 
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brake preserves the probability of collision, it is regarded as a deterrent threat. If 
both players select the brake which is the game equilibrium, it can be said that they 
have selected exactly the compromising point. As the game is symmetric, it is 
sufficient to interpret the game table cells for row players. Cell  represents a 
situation in which both players swerve the straight route before collision by turning 
the steering wheel and are called chickens. This cell of Table 2 is similar to the cell 
 of Table 1. In other words, the selection of steering wheel strategy by each 
player is a non-credible threat and the opponent knows that she/he will pull over. 
The cell  means that the row player pulls the brake and keeps the straight 
line but the column player exits the straight route. In other words, the strategy  can 
be called a credible-deterrent threat because the row player, by selecting this threat, 
made the opponent to pull over. Consequently, the row player is a winner . 
 
The cell  means that the row player continues the straight route and does 
not exit while the column player exits the straight line. This cell of Table 2 is the one 
similar to cell   of Table 1. The strategy  can be called a strictly-
credible threat, once the row player caused the opponent to swerve and he won by 
selecting this threat. The difference between credible-deterrent and the strictly-
credible threat for the selecting player is on the type of loss that makes a threat to 
seem more credible. By its turn, the loss of a credible-deterrent threat is lower than 
the one of a strictly-credible threat. Cell   states that the row player 
continues the straight line and does not withdraw, but the column player pulls the 
brake and does not exit the straight line in which the two players will collide with 
each other. In this situation,   by considering  this collision, none of the players is 
called chicken or winner, differing the harm of collision for both players, based on 
the strategy’s selection type. In other words, the outcome that results from selecting 
a strictly-credible threat versus a credible-deterrent threat is measured in the basis of 
the loss because there was a collision. As mentioned above, the executive loss of the 
strictly-credible threat is higher than that of the credible-deterrent threat. As a result, 
the outcome of the strictly-credible threat is lower than that of the credible-deterrent 
threat.  
 
Cell   states that both players continue the straight line and no one 
withdraw. In this case, the two players will collide with each other. With this 
collision, no one of the players is called “chicken” or winner and the loss of the 
collision will be the same for both players. This cell of Table 2 is similar to the cell 
   of Table 1. Cell   states that both players pull the brake and 
remain in the straight line and don’t exit. In this case the two players will not collide 
with each other. In this cell, no one of the players is called “chicken” or winner. No 
collision has occurred. For this reason, there is a rational response for both players. 
In other words, the selection of a credible-deterrent threat strategy by both players 
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will prevent the collision and the struggle. Also, a strictly dominant credible-
deterrent threat strategy is preferred over the strictly-credible threat for both players. 
As a result, it can be said that selecting the credible-deterrent threat by each player 
will lead to an equilibrium in the game. 
 
3. Currency Wars 
 
In the 21th century, two new currencies emerged- the Chinese Yuan and the 
Eurozone’s Euro - to gradually challenge the hegemony of the system’s installed 
dollar. Many regard these two foreign currencies as very important international 
currencies in the future. The main actors of the new currency war are the Dollar, the 
Yuan and the Euro, which are issued by three big world economic players: the USA, 
China and the European Union, respectively. The scientific research for studying 
games involving these three global super currencies is very important once the 
countries’ economic prosperity is highly dependent on the mutual relations of these 
foreign currencies. In this section, we use game theory to model the interaction 
between Dollar and Yuan, Dollar and Euro and Yuan and Euro.  
 
3.1 Dollar-Yuan Game 
 
Since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the trade between China 
and other countries has considerably increased. China has the second biggest 
economy in the world and is the leader in terms of the global exports, what made 
Yuan becoming an important and attractive currency for investors (Bui, 2019). 
Currently, the Beijing’s strategy for trading with other countries is making 
transactions using the Yuan. Subramanian (2011, pg. 34) assuredly predicts that “the 
possibility of increasing the economic dominance in China is converted into foreign 
currency dominance”; and before the middle of the next decade, Yuan can surpass 
the Dollar as the dominant foreign exchange rate (Cohen, 2018). The war between 
Dollar and Yuan is the central core of today’s financial affairs in the world and one 
of the frontlines of the new currency war (Rickards, 2012). Donald Trump, the USA 
president, for the first time in the trade history of the USA, defined the USA trade 
policies as a player supporting aggressively the USA national security policy 
(Malawer, 2019). It is possible to refer, for example, the 2018’s decision of the 
president Trump for applying tariffs of up to 25 percent to the Chinese imported 
goods worth USD 250 billion (Fuchs et al., 2019). 
 
We model Dollar-Yuan game using the threat game/currency war game. In this 
game, Dollar (USA) is considered as the row player and Yuan (China) is taken as the 
column player. The row player has three actions: accusing China of manipulating 
currency and calling China currency manipulator ( ), protectionism (trade 
limitations and putting a tariff) and negotiation ( ), devaluation of currency ( ). 
The column player has three actions: accusing the US of unilateralism ( ), 
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protectionism (trade limitations and putting tariff) and negotiation ( ), devaluation 
of currency ( ). We show the game Dollar-Yuan in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  The game Dollar-Yuan   
 
Player 1 
          Player 2  
S B SB 
S 0, 0 -3, 3 -2, 2 
B 3, -3 1, 1 -3, -5 
SB 2, -2 -5, -3 -6, -6 
Note: S=Currency manipulator or unilateralism; B=Protectionism and negotiation; 
SB=Devaluation of currency 
Source: Own study. 
 
In trade tension between America and China, the main accusation which is made by 
the USA against China is that China manipulates its foreign exchange rate to keep 
the exports cheap for foreign buyers. For example, in January 1994, China devalued 
its currency, the Yuan, and the USA threatened China to call it currency 
manipulator, based on the Commercial Code of 1988 (Rickards, 2012).   In 2018, 
Donald Trump accused China of manipulating the exchange rate, having China 
responded to the USA’s request to reinforce Yuan. By its turn, China accused the 
USA of manipulating its currency unilaterally. Chen Deming, Former Minister of 
Commerce of China, accused the USA of reckless money-printing because 
American Dollar releases were out of control, increasing the price of international 
goods; the inflation imported invaded China (Cao, 2016). The inflation which had 
been created by USD printing caused a tsunami of capital flow toward China 
markets by combining the commercial surplus and the hot monies, causing also 
inflation in other countries. When looking retrospectively, we notice that the USA 
unilaterally announced its new economic policy in 1971, leading to the devaluation 
of Dollar. As a result, the accusation strategy is a non-credible threat and both 
players did not believe this threat and so, they would not take a step to reinforce 
their currency. Therefore, it can be said that both countries remain in the cell 
 of the game table by selecting the accusation strategy . 
 
In the global economy, protectionism and negotiation ) is a tool that helps 
manufacturers of each country. This tool includes putting tariffs over imported 
goods, for controlling the inflow and outflow of capital and other barriers to free 
trade (Dadush and Eidelman, 2011;  Eichengreen, 2013). Therefore, protectionism is 
considered a deterrent credible threat that remarkably benefits a country due to the 
support that this strategy gives to its domestic products. The high cost of exports of a 
country leads to a reduction on its production,  to an increase in unemployment and a 
loss of foreign markets. Because the exports are more expensive for the American 
consumers and Chinese markets become smaller in the USA.  As result, players are 
placed in cells or  . 
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Another strategy in the currency war between the two countries is currency 
devaluation ). Currency devaluation is possible through inflation, money 
printing, quantitative easing and interest rates   lowering. Quantitative easing is a 
type of unsupported money printing which was first applied by the USA. The 
printed Dollars downhill toward China from the balance of trade increasing route 
resulting from Chinese exports to the USA and through hot money flow to find the 
profits more than what is accessible in the USA (Rickards, 2012). Beijing imports 
inflation from the USA by printing Yuan and through the fixed Dollar-Yuan 
exchange rate. By increasing the Yuan value above inflation, Chinese export costs 
will increase and make the USA stronger to compete with China. Dollar printing 
also means the devaluation of the USA debts to foreign creditors such as China and 
means that they will recover their debts at the cheaper Dollar. As a result, selecting 
the non-credible threat strategy   by China against strategy  by the USA is 
expensive for China, which is the same as Cell  of the game at Table 3.  
 
China can compensate for a situation at which the dollar devaluation benefits with 
tariffs. This is as much as the devaluated Dollar currency using the protectionism 
tools  and remove the benefits resulting from Dollar devaluation in the Chinese 
market. China can retaliate for such action of the USA by putting a tariff on 
American crops such as soybean, cotton and gold (Fuchs, et al., 2019). One of the 
other effects of selecting the protectionism strategy by China is to reduce the 
Chinese investment rate in the USA, preferring the Chinese to invest in the local 
market over the foreign market. Direct investment of China in the USA in 2018 has 
been the only USD 8.4 billion, after having decreased from USD 29 billion in 2017 
and USD 46 billion in 2016 (Goulard, 2020). China can prevent the devaluation of 
the currency reserves by diversifying cash reserves, i.e. China can buy bonds in Yen, 
Euro and pound sterling, which have been exported by countries and banks outside 
the USA. Therefore, China can greatly prevent losses resulting from Dollar 
devaluation to a great extent; that is, the two players are placed in the cell 
.  
 
In March 2018, the USA put custom tariffs of up to 25 percent for the imported steel 
and 10 percent for the imported aluminum and other Chinese goods (Özer, 2020). 
These goods included electronic parts, clothes, scientific and laboratory equipment. 
One of the other important actions of the USA in this trade tension was to sanction 
Huawei Technologies Co. By its turn, as mentioned above, China rapidly retaliated 
this action by putting tariffs and controlling the inflow and outflow of capital. This 
practically was  the beginning of the trade tension between China and the USA and, 
since then, different tariffs have been imposed by both parties to the opposite party’s 
goods. There are also some trade negotiations between the economic leaders of 
China and the USA, which news affect markets. This trade war has no winner. In 
December 2019, these two countries reached an agreement, approving to avoid their 
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previous plans that aimed to increase more importation tariffs on each other’s 
products, increasing now China the American crop rate and energy for the first 
phase of this trade agreement. The USA has been also obliged to reduce the tariff on 
the importation of goods at a value of 120 billion from China from 15 to 5.7 
(Berthou and Stumpner, 2020;  Wong et al., 2020). It can be consequently said that 
selecting the protectionism and negotiation strategy by players is the solution for 
exiting the hard condition of the Threat game that is  the game Nash 
Equilibrium.  
 
If china selects the strategy , the USA can retaliate using the protectionism tools 
as mentioned above (Mauldin, 2019). Studies conducted by Bloomberg show that in 
2019, the USA economy got a damage of USD 134 billion, due to the trade tension 
between the USA and China, reaching such damage likely USD 316 billion by the 
end of the following year, what is equivalent to from 3.0 to 7.0 percent of the USA 
total GDP (Hartmann and Issing, 2002). It can be said that selecting the strategy   
by the USA against Chinese money devaluation is expensive for the American 
economy and players are placed in a cell . 
 
If the USA devaluates the dollar currency through inflation, Chinese currency 
reserves will be devalued in terms of the US Dollar debts. On the contrary, by its 
turn, China can sell the USA treasury bonds all at once. Considering supply and 
demand law that governs the bonds market, increasing supply in this market causes a 
decrease on its price, what makes that a large amount of the damage resulting from 
such reduction will return to China itself (Rickards, 2012). The national security of 
the USA is largely dependent on the dollar. If the dollar is devalued, the national 
security will collapse concurrently. As a result of selecting the strategy  by the 
two players, the worst possible result in this currency war game is the cell 
 on the game’s table.   
 
Our findings show that protectionism is a dominant strategy and is a credible-
deterrent threat, which prevents the competitive devaluation of money. China seeks 
to reinforce its currency to make it known as an important currency in international 
trade. The USA seeks to recover the lost trust in the dollar and wants to place the 
dollar on the top of international exchanges. This model shows that protectionism 
ends in the trade war and currency devaluation ends in the currency war. The 
protectionism can be a brake for preventing the catastrophic consequences of the 
currency war.  
 
There are many reasons that most countries use protectionism tools in the future 
instead of currency evaluation and turn to the trade war. First, the trade war will 
occur between the two countries, which can be controlled and does not involve the 
whole global economy. Second, protectionism tools are taken into account for the 
individual (national) interests on the way of development and are less expensive for 
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the individual and the global economy. However, tools for the competitive 
devaluation of money are considered as taking step in the ambiguous direction with 
mirage-like perspective; the worst result will be economic recession. Third, the 
global monetary system and the currency reserves will tend to be multipolar, what is 
a strong reason for beginning trade wars between countries. Fourth, since some 
countries benefit from trade wars between countries, the probability of trade war 
spreading is low, such as in Vietnam and the Eurozone affected by the Washington-
Beijing trade. Although the current trade war between the USA and China has 
caused dissatisfaction among both parties, and a trade agreement can return trust and 
confidence between Washington and Beijing. 
 
3.2 Yuan-Euro Game 
 
Euro, as the European currency, was born in 1999, for which a good future had been 
predicted. Robert A. Mundell stated that “Euro will undoubtedly challenge the dollar 
condition and change the configuration of the system power” (Mundell, 2000; pg. 
27). The economic growth of the Eurozone was remarkable before the financial 
crisis of 2008, but such a crisis took economists to be doubtful about the economic 
resilience of the Eurozone. Such a crisis caused fragility of the Eurozone and 
considering the China’s good condition and strong position, this country made use of 
such opportunity and cooperated with Europe.  
 
China got closer to this union by purchasing some of the foreign debts of the 
members of the Eurozone.   A  strong euro contributed to the diversification of the 
position of the Chinese currency reserve to replace Dollar with more Euro (Foo, 
2019). Beijing also sought to get access to sensitive European technologies and 
bought advanced military systems by making a direct investment in Europe. Such 
cooperation made the European Union to turn into one of the largest trade partners 
of China. It can then be said that the game between Yuan-Euro is the Stag hunt game 
 in Table 4. 
 
In the game between China and the Eurozone, both players prefer cooperation   to 
non-cooperation . The trade tension between the USA and China also caused 
challenges as well as opportunities for the European countries. The European Union 
suffered from a severe trade deficit against China as well as a potential violation of 
the intellectual property rights by Chinese companies. Several economic sections 
such as properties and real estate, tourism, or education had very limited economic 
growth due to the trade war between the USA and China. As a result, cooperation 
led to more activities of the Chinese customers (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2014; 
Goulard, 2020). European companies may benefit from China’s reluctance to use 
products and services of the USA. Since China and the European Union are the 
target of the USA trade sanctions, there will be more cooperation between Yuan and 
Euro in the future (Forrest et al., 2017; European External Action Service, 2019). 
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Table 4.  Stag hunt game  
Player 1 Player 2  
C D 
C 4, 4 1, 3 
D 3, 1 2, 2 
Note: C= cooperate; D= non-cooperate 
Source: Own study. 
 
3.3 Dollar-Euro Game 
 
The Dollar-Euro game is similar to Harmony game , considering the economic 
and political relations between the USA and Europe before the presidency of Trump. 
In the financial crisis of 2008, the USA supported Europe with financial 
contributions for different reasons based on its own benefits, because a strong euro 
can keep up the desire of the Europeans to purchase cars, airplanes, drugs, software, 
crops, other goods and services which the USA provides. 
Table 5.  Harmony game   
 
Player 1 
Player 2  
C D 
C 4, 4 3, 2 
D 2, 3 1, 1 
Note: C= cooperate; D= non-cooperate 
Source: Own study. 
 
America First Policy of Donald Trump is an important factor which has changed the 
Dollar-Yuan game. Since April 2018, the USA has started to exert a 25% tax on 
steel and a 10% tax on aluminum produced by the EU. Since then, the Trump 
administration threatened the EU to paying the new tax. For example, the European 
automotive industry was threatened by Trump (considering the tariff imposition in 
2019). Trump administration also threatened to increase tariffs of French drinks and 
other European symbolic products. In May 2018, Trump decided to leave the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA). For this reason, European companies were 
faced with more sanctions by the USA government for trading with Iran. After that, 
several European companies decided to leave the Iran market, fearing that they 
could be sanctioned by the USA. For example, the French Total S.A. formally left 
its gas project in August 2018 and transferred it to CNPC Company. Finally, the 
USA and the EU separated from each other in Huawei’s case and the Europeans 
decided to ignore the pressure of the USA for Huawei prohibition.  
 
Today we see several rounds of tariffs increasing between the USA and China and 
can also see a new round of tariffs classification between the USA and EU. If the 
USA intensifies its hostility against the EU, the EU may have not the way but 
expanding its cooperation treaties with China. More cooperation may be regarded as 
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the European support of China in the Dollar-Yuan battle for global leadership. If the 
USA and China move toward more tension in terms of money devaluation, the 
Dollar-Yuan battlefield will be directed toward the Eurozone. The Eurozone will be 
converted into a battlefield and the fire of war will enrage the powerful financial 
weapon of Europe. After United Kingdom leaving EU, the EU faces a crisis of 
solidarity reduction among the remaining countries, in this economic crisis; 
expanding this fact euro favors Germany against other member countries of the EU.   
 
In a study which shows the Europe’s perspective in 2030, the combination of factors 
(such as the aging of population which will result in a considerable decrease of the 
existing labor force soon, the minor growth rate of productivity in Europe due to the 
shortage of investment in research, and the human capital erosion due to the 
elongation of unemployment) will cause a weaker growth of the Gross Domestic 
Product in Europe (Włodarczyk, 2014). We anticipate that the Eurozone will be 
entangled in fire of the currency war of those two countries in the future and will 
turn into their battlefield. For reference, Brazil was one of the 2011 financial crisis’ 
losers, although the main loser will be the Eurozone in the total currency war 
between China and the USA. 
 
4. The Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on the Global Economy 
 
The 2008 financial crisis, the oil wars and the attack on the country’s oil facilities, 
and finally the Coronavirus pandemic drastically changed the global world equation 
as well as the forecast for the world’s economic growth rate. The coronavirus 
pandemic is one of the biggest shocks of the current generation because it changed 
the daily economic activity of many nations on an unprecedented scale and the 
extent of about 210 countries and regions at the current times of peace. Perhaps even 
the most pessimistic economists did not think that one day a respiratory disease 
could affect the economies of countries at this level, dividing the world into years 
before and after the coronavirus pandemic. Reports from major international 
organizations and institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Labor Organization, show a steady decline in the global economic 
growth since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic.    
 
The most important priority of all countries is to try to prevent the spread of 
COVID-19 pandemic and control it as soon as possible. To overcome this 
unbalanced epidemic, the international community must strengthen its solidarity. 
The hyper-rational thinking also suggests that countries and international societies 
cooperate with others based on their hyper-preferences in the situation of the 
COVID-19 pandemic and consider the collective benefit (Askari et al., 2019; Askari 
and Eshaghi Gordji, 2020). Considering this concept, each hyper-rational decision-
maker has three sets of choices: (1) set of individual preferences, (2) set of 
preferences for others, (3) both classes at the same time. In the Stag hunt game  , 
based on the concept of hyper-rationality, if the interaction between players is based 
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on collective benefit thinking then, for both players, cooperation  is a strictly 
dominant action, and  is preferred to  by the two players. Indeed, 
we need that the decision-makers, in addition to personal profit and loss, consider 
the profit and the loss of others and then choose their strategy to continue. So the 
members of the G7 and G20 must continue to promote monetary and fiscal policy 
cooperation. If the relations between the countries are modeled during the 
coronavirus pandemic crisis using the Threat game, what strategy will be chosen by 
countries?  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In this article, the difference between the currency war and trade war was outlined, 
being mentioned their effects on the global economy. For this purpose, we analyzed 
trade relations between the USA and China, China and Europe and the USA and 
Europe, supported by game theory. In the Dollar-Yuan game, strategies of each 
player include accusation, protectionism and negotiation, and devaluation of money. 
The threat game has a logical equilibrium , because if both players use the 
credible-deterrent threat, they have pulled the brake of preventing the catastrophic 
consequences which are in the strictly-credible threat. The loss of executing a 
strictly-credible threat is higher than that of the credible-deterrent threat.  
 
In the Dollar-Yuan game, strategies of each player include accusation, protectionism 
and negotiation, and devaluation of money. Protectionism ends in a trade war and 
money devaluation ends in a currency war. We show that the trade war and 
negotiation are a brake for preventing the currency war because the consequences of 
the trade war and its spread speed will be much lower than those of the currency 
war. Besides, in the trade war, only two countries are involved and other countries 
may benefit from that but in the currency war, competitive devaluation of money 
spreads everywhere like dominoes and its result will make the global economy 
depressed. In other words, the trade war is a sort of hostility between two countries 
but the currency war will raise the alarm for the whole economy of the world. When 
a country weakens its currency to devaluate its debts or reinforce exports compared 
to other countries, it can be said that the country has entered a total currency war 
with the world because it not only impoverishes the neighboring countries but also 
gets better results in exports with its trade partners. 
 
We assume the global economy as a greenwood, the currency devaluation is like a 
spark of fire in this forest, the result of the spread of wildfire is eventually 
incineration of the forest or a global economic depression. Spark of fire may be 
deliberate or unintentional and aims to gain access to the fertile lands. National 
currency devaluation aims to achieve more exports. A state’s exports can be 
considered the fertile land. Competitive devaluation of the national currency by the 
states against each other is like blowing the fire. If the fire is spread, the growing 
saplings and strong trees will burn altogether and even some animal and plant 
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species are killed completely. In currency war fire, some newly emerging economies 
which are the growing saplings will be damaged more but when the fire of currency 
war spreads, the developed economies as strong trees will catch fire as well. When 
the currency is devalued, reactive capital flight is recognized. Capital is like the 
living animals entrapped in fire seeking to find safe shelters to escape from danger.  
 
At the end, when the fire is put out, a burnt forest will remain and it takes several 
years to flourish. The catastrophic results of the total currency war for all countries 
in the world can be clearly understood. As a result, it can be said that the currency 
war is like the spread of fire in the forest but trade war is like deforestation. In both 
cases, the forest is damaged but it differs depending on the type of damage, volume, 
and extent of damages. In other words, the global economy is depressed in the 
currency war but global economic growth becomes slow in the trade war. 
 
The policymakers politically make advantage of the currency devaluation by 
promising to increase exports, production and new jobs, to cause deviation of 
difficult and problematic economic issues of the local societies. The competitive 
devaluation of money causes instability of the system and no one can derive a 
benefit from it and will lead to an increase in production costs, mutual money 
devaluation of other countries, tariff classification, imposing commercial limitations 
and finally the global recession. The recent trade tensions are not only related to 
bilateral trade deficit but also related to technology superiority as much as with the 
issues related to immigration. Weak investment is recognized as one of the 
distinctive consequences of trade tensions.  
 
Therefore, to prevent the expansion of currency conflicts, there should exist a 
powerful collective leadership. The G20 commitment is a good start for preventing 
the targeting for the currency rate for competitive purposes, although punitive 
policies should be used for the wrongdoers beside them. Also, advanced economies 
should avoid direct action of exchange intervention in case of the global recession, 
providing that their trade partners don’t change their currency rate. For this reason, it 
can be said that the world needs a new global monetary system between Dollar, 
Yuan, Euro, and also that other countries should connect their currencies with one of 
these currencies. Besides, the possibility of international competition among all 
countries should be taken into account. Once the monetary system and currency 
reserves are multipolar, states will more likely tend to have protectionism instead of 
a competitive devaluation of money.  
 
Due to the Nash equilibrium of the threat, the United States and China can move 
toward a trade agreement and choose the dominant strategy. Europe and the United 
States are moving towards more trade and political tensions. Given the trade 
tensions between Europe and the United States, it is likely that China-European 
trade relations will be strengthened and closer to each other. 
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